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What does it mean to say that ethics are possible today? At least two things.
First, it forces a re-evaluation of a disciplinary or cultural state of affairs that
I understand Ato Sekyi-Otu to be most principally intervening against: an overzealous
conflation of moral universalism with the European cultural imperialism which it has
so often concealed. This conflation allows for potentially deleterious and inegalitarian
cultural mores to go unchallenged or unscrutinized, insofar as such challenges can be
dismissed as extensions of cultural imperialism. Thus, Sekyi-Otu makes possible and
ineluctable the asking of such questions as whether or not allowing a Canadian
11-year-old to invoke her aboriginal right “to refuse chemotherapy for treatment of
her leukaemia in favour of traditional healing,” (67) and so allowing her to die, as
did an Ontario court in 2014, is in the order of good things, and if it is, how it is.
Sekyi-Otu’s wide-ranging lines of argument do not set out to resolve this dispute or
disputes like it; rather they serve to intervene against a kind of ethical segregation
that would foreclose the possibility of such disputation in the first place.
Second, to insist, as Sekyi-Otu does, that ethical claims, as normative and universal,
are possible today runs against both a Derridean and a Foucauldian account of “the
good,” both of which accounts continue to have considerable currency in the academy.
How that running-against plays out is what I would like to consider in what follows,
though always keeping in mind the Africacentric thrust of Left Universalism’s claims.
Granted, Sekyi-Otu gives Foucault and Derrida only passing mention in his book –
and hardly anyone does not receive at least passing mention in his book. However, I
understand Sekyi-Otu, in his dizzying citational field, to be taking advantage of an epis-
temological upshot to his ethical argument that there is a “vernacular ‘Kantianism’
native to every culture” (18), that every moral claim partakes of the universal, irrespect-
ive of where it comes from – the upshot being that everybody who talks ethics is talk-
ing the same language, whether they know it or not, and so can be made to talk to one
another. It is this which allows Sekyi-Otu’s interlocutors to run the gamut from, well,
Armah to Zizek. Indeed, Sekyi-Otu undertakes his own project of what he calls
“conjunctive anamnesis” (148) in re-membering discourses that are geographically or
disciplinarily severed. It is in the spirit of this conjunctive project that I add Foucault
and Derrida’s vernacular Kantianisms to the discussion of Sekyi-Otu’s universal claim.
I conceive of the Derridean branch as insisting that ethical practices and values –
such as hospitality, forgiveness, mourning, justice – are fundamentally and irreducibly
impossible, that the impossible reconciliation between, one the one hand, fallible and
violent legal institutions within a given historical space, and on the other hand,
unconditional universal values, for the protection and encouragement of which we
would wish to transform and improve those institutions, is what makes ethics, ethics
(On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 22–23). This contradicts Sekyi-Otu’s account,
which holds that every local ethical claim, even in the introverted form of “this is the
way we do things here,” (Sekyi-Otu, 21) must be understood as implying a universal
normative set, and it is the possibility of this articulation from the local to the
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universal that marks the ethical as ethical. Under one particular and contestable fram-
ing of deconstructive thought, then, we have an understanding of ethics as fundamen-
tally, universally impossible, pace Sekyi-Otu.
By contrast, the Foucauldian consideration of ethics that I want to discuss here is
one which recognizes the contingent, rather than fundamental, impossibility of ethical
practice. This is the line of argument pursued in Foucault’s Hermeneutics of the Subject
– that care or knowledge of the self, as ethical obligation and first step towards the
good, is in principle a practice that is open to everybody, but which very few are actu-
ally capable of pursuing. This structure of interplay “between a universal principle
which can only be heard by a few, and this rare salvation from which no one is
excluded a priori,” becomes for Foucault a fundamental political problem for
Christianity and the West (119). I might be identifying here a particular kind of univer-
salism, and misreading it as a universal universalism, but it seems to me that the situ-
ation Foucault describes, where ethical obligation which can be fulfilled has the latent
property of being universal but the manifest property of being particular as a conse-
quence of an uneven distribution of resources or opportunity, poses a serious problem
for ethical practice in the postcolony, where the distribution of resources is unjust and
becoming more so. Ought, says Kant, implies can; what do we do with vernacular
Kantians who, because of legacies of dispossession and displacement, can’t?
Taken together, one might be forgiven for thinking of this dual invocation of
Foucault and Derrida as a sophomoric attempt at refuting Sekyi-Otu; universal ethics
are conceptually impossible, following Derrida, and even if this were not the case,
universal ethics are contingently impossible, following Foucault. The problem is that I
agree with Sekyi-Otu, and I am wanting to determine how to maintain that agree-
ment without a wholesale dismissal of the Derridean and Foucauldian ventures.
We might begin that process by revising Foucault. Without contesting his
description of a particular strain of self-knowledge coming to establish a schema for
how putatively universal salvation discursively operates in a Christian tradition, we
might not be willing to apply that schema to all ethical thought everywhere, least of
all now. Foucault suggests that ethical practice is a luxury of the aristocracy to dear
for the proletariat; we might suggest that in light of the seriousness of our global
predicament, and the uneven distribution of precarity within that predicament, it is
precisely the proletariat and precariat who can least afford to sidestep the ethical
injunction of community and equality – in short the ethical injunction of commun-
ism. And we would be right. But this would not make Foucault wrong, or not about
this; because after all, the revolution has not come, the ethical has been and is being
sidestepped.
But what is this ethical? For Foucault it designates a particular discourse and a way
of conceiving of the subject, evacuated of its normative component outside of the spe-
cific structure of power that enforces or proposes it, of positive signification only to
those elect who have the resources or wherewithal to go from ethical obligation to eth-
ical act. For Derrida, it is the impossibility of fully mediating between act and obliga-
tion that identifies and defines the ethical; there is on the one hand no purely ethical
act, because it is an act and thus limited by being manifest, and on the other no purely
ethical obligation, because as pure obligation without material support, it is inert.
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And for Sekyi-Otu, if I understand this book correctly, the ethical designates an
autonomous, normative set of obligations and rights, which is universal by dint of an
appeal to some fundamental humanity in the background of every normative claim
(Sekyi-Otu’s axiom of “honouring the human”) but local insofar as it wishes to pro-
tect particular manifestations of that universal (“deferring to difference”). These two
demands are in turn supported by the obligation to “cultivate the commons,” that is
the obligation to reinforce the civic ground, at the scale of the nation, upon which
this honouring and deferral can legitimately take place. Which is to say that Sekyi-
Otu is attempting to mediate between the universal, the individual, and the collective,
so as to work through the supposed impossibility of the Derridean dyad, and indeed
to work though the main difficulty faced by philosophies of the subject. The solution
is neat; rather than suggest, with Derrida, or with the cultural essentialist, that the
particular/self and the universal/Other are in a relationship of contradiction, let us
suppose or recognize that these are at best in a relationship of contrariety, and pos-
sibly one of entailment. And so while we might not always know precisely how to
shuttle from the particular to the universal, the point remains, pace Derrida (or pace
a vulgar Derrideanism), that we can perform this mediation, at least conceptually.
I am less certain of the Foucauldian problem. We may be able to recognize that
a given local ethical claim or ethical judgement fulfils a universal norm; or, if this is
not a process of recognition, then a fashioning-together of a local set of norms
which can be understood by their universal entailments. Our capacity to fulfil that
obligation, however, whether we recognize the obligation as universal or not, is con-
tingent upon particular, local, material conditions; Bertolt Brecht’s old rejoinder:
first the grub, then the morality. This is the issue that Sekyi-Otu’s final chapter,
“Enigmas and Proverbs,” takes up, within the context of African literary culture’s
ostensibly vexed investments in the true, the beautiful, and the universal, on the
one hand, and the abject, the particular, and the local, on the other. If anything,
Sekyi-Otu doubles down on Foucault, concluding, approvingly, with a discussion of
the profoundly hard work and the profound absence of guarantees that the novelists
Ayi Kwei Armah and Bessie Head demand of and offer to their narrators, protago-
nists, and readers; Head’s A Question of Power in particular is a novel in which
belonging [less; merely “a gesture of belonging” (206)] is achieved only at the far
end of a litany of dispossessions, and without any promise of persistence. Says
Foucault: the ethical choice is theoretically open to all, but practically only to a few.
Says Sekyi-Otu: the ethical choice is the only choice that we might survive, and it
will be taken by even fewer than that.
Two thoughts on this: first, I think Sekyi-Otu is right to insist upon the primacy
of work in Armah and Head. I recognize that this is very likely my succumbing to a
leftist fetishizing of communal labour, but it seems to me to be the necessary, if
insufficient, component to answering both the Derridean and Foucauldian concerns
that I have been thinking through in this response. Because if we wish to assert
that the relationship between the individual and the collective can be mediated, then
this mediation must come through labour – as the individual comes to recognize and
shape the relationship between their labour and that of the collective, the mutual
interests of both becomes apparent; this becomes the ground of possibility by which,
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as is important for Sekyi-Otu, communism can be arrived at by an active and ethical
choice, not simply by ways of some inagential scientific–Marxist teleology.
Second, this collective labour seems to me the likeliest source of some common ground
upon which the appeal of such an ethical choice might be persuasively posed, and heard.
Latent in Sekyi-Otu’s prerogative to honour humanity, to defer to difference, and to culti-
vate the commons, is the recognition or establishment of some kind of community –
some kind of space in which radical, ethical judgement can be voiced and engaged with.
Says Simone Weil, another vernacular Kantian who was particularly engaged with that
cultivation described by Sekyi-Otu, named in her output enracinement:
Art has no immediate future because all art is collective and there is no more collective life
(there are only dead collections of people), and also because of this breaking of the true pact
between the body and the soul… It is therefore quite useless for you to envy Leonardo or
Bach. Greatness in our times must take a different course. (Gravity and Grace, 151)
Which is to say: I think Sekyi-Otu is right, in his recuperation of the universal, of the
normative, of the individual, and the enigmatic. But it is not enough to be right; one
must also be persuasive, because survival, if survival is what we want, is contingent
upon collective action. How do we call the collective into being, how do we make
ethical claims upon it in a way which it will hear? Time is running very short.
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Rethinking the Center from the Left: Postcolonial Humanity and Universalism
in Ato Sekyi-Otu’s Left Universalism, Africacentric Essays
Left Universalism, Africacentric Essays is unpretentious in its aim: to defend universalism
from an Africa-centered purview. Ato Sekyi-Otu’s critical move lies in severing the ties
that situate universalism as a Eurocentric logic of imperialism while disavowing the
nativist relativism often attributed to postcolonial studies in what he calls, “postcolonial
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